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1 INTRODUCTION1
Trapped in a severe macroeconomic crisis, financial and fiscal imbalances, and the
subsequent sovereign debt crisis involving the European Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU), the leaders of the different Member States convened at an EU
Council meeting in December 2011 in order to engage in a debate on how they
might foster budgetary discipline, strengthen the mechanism of economic policy
coordination and improve economic policy governance in the euro area. Twenty
five Member States agreed on a Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance
in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG) or Fiscal Compact Treaty (FCT)
with the formal status of a Treaty between the EU participating States later
finalized in an informal summit in January 2012 and signed in March of the same
year.This article analyzes the implementation of the new Treaty within the Italian
legal order. Section 2 introduces the concepts of the balanced budget rule as an
external constraint in the context of the Italian fiscal and economic policy. Section
3 briefly surveys the fundamental provisions introduced by the Fiscal Compact.
Section 4 analyzes the implementation of the Treaty in Italy with particular
reference to the new amendments to the Italian Constitution. Section 5 concludes.
We argue that because of the many loopholes in the Italian process of
implementation, the new Treaty won’t per se change or straighten out the Italian
approach responsible for the current public debt situation.
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2 THE BALANCED BUDGET RULE AS AN EXTERNAL
CONSTRAINT ON ITALY’S FISCAL POLICY
In early 2008, Italy’s public debt as a percentage of GDP was at its lowest rate since
1994. Due to fiscal deficit improvements in 2006 and 2007, the European
Commission recommended the ECOFIN Council to abrogate the Excessive
Deficit Procedure (EDP) against Italy, in accordance with Article 104 § 3TEU.2 In
June 2008 the Council finally abrogated Decision 2005/694/EC.3 This however
did not imply that Italy was out of danger.As the Council of the European Union
spelled out in its Opinion on Italy’s Updated Stability Programme in February
2008, a public debt-to-GDP ratio above 100% and the still relatively high […] budgetary
deficit, increase economic uncertainty and generate a high cost of debt service, making Italy
vulnerable to increases in interest rates.4 A year later, on November 30 2009, after the
updated Stability Programme of the 4th Berlusconi Government had not shown
any considerable progress when compared with its original version, the ECOFIN
Council again assessed Italy’s excessive deficit, stressing that the budget deficit
cannot be considered temporary, since the deficit is projected to increase further in 2010 and,
on a no-policy change basis, to decrease5 .
Despite profiting from low interest rates for almost a decade, Italy’s political
class increased public spending rather than pursuing a sustainable consolidation of
the national budget.Though running primary surpluses until 2008, at the outbreak
of the European sovereign-debt crisis, the huge public debt was not significantly
reduced, nor did Italy reach a balanced budget in structural terms.6 Only recently,
Italy was forced to cope with EU fiscal rules, with the alternative being the risk of
a financial collapse. EU economic and fiscal oversight became progressively more
intrusive vis-à-vis the Member States, in particular after the Lisbon Treaty entered
into force. The first legal tool implementing new Article 121 TFEU was the
‘European Semester’,7 a timetable meant to address the problems of both poor
fiscal oversight and ineffective economic policy coordination between Member
States.Through a so-called ‘integrated approach’, the ‘European Semester’ provided
2 Recommendation for a Council Decision abrogating Decision 2005/694/EC on the existence of an excessive
deficit in Italy, 7 May 2005, SEC(2008) 574 final.
3 Council Decision of 3 June 2008 abrogating Decision 2005/694/EC on the existence of an excessive deficit in
Italy, 2008/560/EC.
4 Council Opinion of 12 February 2008 on the Updated Stability Programme of Italy, 2007-2011, 2008/C
49-08.
5 Council Decision of 19 January 2010 on the existence of an excessive deficit in Italy, 2010/286/EU.
6 The primary surplus was eroded ‘on account of a significant increase in current primary expenditure’. See
European Commission Staff Working Paper, Assessment of the 2011 national reform programme and
stability programme of Italy, 7 Jun. 2011.
7 The ‘European Semester’ entered into force on 1 Jan. 2011 and was then translated into EU secondary
legislation in November 2011 through Regulation No. 1175/2011. See G. Trupiano, The New
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EU Institutions with new powers enabling the Commission and the Council to
exert direct influence on the democratic legislative procedure of each Member
State.
The balanced budget rule has been at issue, at least since the first ‘European
Semester’.The legal act in which we may find the first formal encouragement to
enshrine the rule into the internal legal orders of the Member States is the
intergovernmental Euro Plus Pact, - :- signed on March 24 2011 by twenty-three
European Union Heads of State and Government.8 Implicitly alluding to the
model of the German ‘Debt-Brake’, the Pact, which builds on the Franco-German
‘Competitiveness Pact’ initiative,9 prescribed the transposition into binding
national law (‘e.g., Constitution or Framework Law’) of the fiscal rules stemming
from the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), in particular those demanding balanced
budgets in structural terms. The Pact hinted that the existing EU rules were not
sufficient to limit sovereign debt, therefore requiring the Member States to change
their own rules at national level.
The nature of the Euro Plus Pact however is not merely political, as many
scholars seem to believe.10 Its provisions in fact integrate those of the ‘European
Semester’,11 insofar as they provide further objectives for the coordination of fiscal
and economic policy (see Article 2-a 2. letter d) Regulation n. 1175/2011).Thus, a
Member State, by submitting its National Reform Program (NRP) and its
Stability Programme (SP), should inter alia take into account the general guidance
issued by the European Council. This was done proactively by Italy in its 2011
DEF, the Economic and Financial Document containing both its NRP and its SP.
Point 2.2 letter a) of the Pact explicitly mentions the intention of embedding a
balanced budget rule into the Constitution.
In its recommendation issued on July 12 2011, the ECOFIN Council
welcomed the commitment to enshrine a balanced budget into the Constitution,
qualifying it as in line with the principles of the Euro Plus Pact (§ 16).12 The first law
bills for amending the Constitution were put forward by some members of the
Italian Parliament starting on July 19, 2011, whereas the bill which afterwards
European Governance: The European Semester and the Coordination of Economic and Budgetary Policy, in
F. Praussello, ed., The Eurozone Experience: Monetary Integration in the Absence of a European Government,
Roma, Franco Angeli, 2012.
8 European Council, Brussels 24/25 March 2011 – Conclusions, EUCO 1o/1/11 REV 1 – CO EUR
6 CONCL. 3.
9 Thedraft is available here:http://www.euractiv.com/sites/all/euractiv/files/BRNEDA224_004512.pdf.
10 See inter alia M.Ruffert,The European Debt Crisis and European Union Law, Com.Market Law Review
48, 1777–1806, 2011.
11 See Euro-Plus Pact I, Economic Policy n. 2.
12 Council Recommendation of 12 July 2011 on the National Reform Programme 2011 of Italy and delivering a
Council opinion on the updated Stability Programme of Italy, 2011-2014, (2011/ C 215/02).
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represented the basis for the reform had been submitted shortly after the Euro Plus
Pact was signed. In August 2011, amid severe turbulence on the sovereign bond
markets, the European Central Bank (ECB) intervened, in accordance with the
Securities Market Program (SMP) launched in May 2010. Its President,
Jean-Claude Trichet and the Italian member of the Governing Council, Mario
Draghi, secretly sent a letter to the Italian Prime Minister, regarding as crucial that
all actions listed [in the letter should have been] followed by parliamentary ratification by
end September 2011. Quite surprisingly, the letter only alluded to the enshrinement
of a balanced budget rule at the very end (A constitutional reform tightening fiscal rules
would also be appropriate), as if all measures contained in the letter could be realized
only in the light of this precise fiscal policy principle.
That this principle was of paramount importance to the EU as a whole is
evidenced by a further private letter from the Commissioner for Economic and
Monetary Affairs and Vice-president of the EC dated November 8 2011,
requesting clarification on the letter submitted by PM Silvio Berlusconi to the
President of the European Council and the President of the European
Commission on the occasion of the first Euro Summit on October 26 2011. In
particular, the EU Commissioner requested that Italy report back on “secondary
legislation required to make the [balanced budget] rule operational and consistent with the
EU budgetary framework”, as well as on “the monitoring mechanisms/institutions” due to
be established (§ 6 - 2). Additionally, at the time there were still questions to be
answered concerning the consistency of the rule’s ‘asymmetrical approach’, as
designed in the bill of the Government13, i.e., if an absence of the obligation to
consolidate during an economic upturn was still in conformity with the medium
term objective and the SGP deficit criteria.14 Finally, EU Commissioner Rehn
hinted that an expenditure rule, rectius a constitutional cap on public spending,
would also be welcome at EU level. As the European Commission had pointed
out in its recommendation, Italy was suffering from a “lack of effective enforcement
mechanisms to control primary expenditure”.This stand furthermore conforms with the
principles underlying the Council directive on requirements for budgetary
frameworks of the Member States which were approved on the same day.15
On November 11 2011, Berlusconi’s Government offered a brief reply to the
letter: 1) the law bill, which was due to be passed by Parliament, had been revised
in order to apply the rule symmetrically in cyclical upturns and downturns. On
this point the Commission seemed to be rather uninformed, since the joint
13 See Art. 2 of the bill A.C.No. 4620, presented according to Arts 71 and 138 IC.
14 Similarly Camera dei Deputati, Introduzione del principio del pareggio di bilancio nella Carta costituzionale,
A.C. n. 4620 e abb. N. 511, 4 Oct. 2011.
15 See Proposal for a Council Directive on Requirements for Budgetary Frameworks of the Member
States, Brussels, 29 Sep. 2010 COM(2010) 523 final, 4.
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examination of different law bills submitted to the Parliament had already started
on October 5 2011; 2) as for the monitoring mechanisms, the Italian Government
generally refers to a future power of the Court of Auditors (Corte dei Conti),
which was going to be “entitled to undertake legal actions before the Constitutional
Court if a breach can be presumed”. No trace of such a provision is to be found in
either the final version of the Constitutional Law n. 1/2012 approved by
Parliament on April 17 2012 or in the reinforced Law n. 243/2013 pursuant to
new Article 81(6) IC; 3) the Italian Government argued that an expenditure rule
had already been envisaged by Article 40 lett. h) of the Law n. 196/2009, as
amended by Law n. 39/2011. However the aforementioned limit, extended to all
kinds of expenditure and not only to discretionary ones, is not apriori set nor it is
enshrined in the Constitution.As the Government itself clarified, the expenditure
rule should be “set in principle by the Economic and Financial Document (DEF) and
adopted with the subsequent budget law and must be consistent with the three-year resource
plan”. In the DEF submitted by the Monti Government to the European
Commission on April 20, 2012 as well as in 2013 DEF no reference to any kind of
expenditure rule is to be found. After the Constitutional amendment had entered
into force, the ECOFIN Council made clear in its recommendation16 that
“implementing legislation” was still “needed to specify key features of the rule”. It remains
therefore to be seen (see infra Part 3) whether the reinforced Law n. 243/2012
actually provides Italy with the “appropriate correction mechanisms and escape clauses”.
In the light of the above, it is worth bearing in mind that the whole
constitutional revision procedure was intertwined with several EU legal acts issued
by EU institutions which were not only in charge of monitoring the procedure
itself, but were also willing to provide the Italian Government with explicit
guidance. Before agreeing on the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG), the so-called Fiscal
Compact Treaty (FCT), the choice of embedding a balanced budget rule into the
Italian Constitution was hardly to be referred either to the Italian legislator or to
the Italian Government.17 The present article offers no discussion of whether
Italy’s commitment to amend its Constitution should have rather been judged as
an order by EU institutions to do so and, if this was the case, whether this order
was or not ultra vires in respect to Article 5§1 TEU in combination with Article
4§2 TEU (violation of the conferral of powers principle infringing the national
16 Council Recommendation on the National Reform Programme 2012 of Italy and delivering a Council opinion on
the Stability Programme of Italy, 2012-2015, Brussels 6 Jul. 2012.
17 T. Groppi, The Impact of the Financial Crisis on the Italian Written Constitution, Italian Journal of Public
Law,Vol. 2 (2012), 6.
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identity of a Member State)18 . Nevertheless, it must be observed that, for the first
time in Italian constitutional history, the commitment to amend the Constitution
was initially submitted by the Italian Government directly to EU institutions.This
was a rather peculiar procedure, one which is not taken into account by Article 71
IC in combination with Article 138 IC.
3 THE FISCAL COMPACTTREATY
As previously stated, the necessity of fostering budgetary discipline and achieving
better coordination among the different members of the Euro zone led to the new
Fiscal Compact, which substantially amends and consolidates the previously
existing rules of the Stability and Growth Pact and the measures enacted later with
the so-called “Six-Pack”.The Treaty was agreed upon at the European Council on
9 December 2011, during one of the worst periods of the Euro area crisis, and
went into effect on January 1 2013 due to the effect of the ratification of the 12th
Contracting Party, Finland on December 21st 2012, with endorsement from all the
States, except the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom. It is worth
mentioning that under the new framework for European Economic Governance,
financial assistance is conditional on the ratification of the Treaty and the
transposition of the required rule on balanced budget.19
The Fiscal Compact consists of two main elements: a structurally balanced
budget rule, comprehending an automatic correction mechanism, and a
reinforcement of the rules on the excessive deficit procedure. In general, as
provided by the Treaty, Governments’ budgets should be either balanced or in
surplus.
For the purposes of our analysis, it is worth highlighting Articles 3 and 8 of
the Treaty. Article 3 (1) FCT specifies that the general budget of the signatory
States must be “balanced or in surplus”, and adds the detail providing in the same
article for the possibility to deviate from the objective temporarily “only in
exceptional circumstances as described by Article 3(3)(b) FCT. As an overall
18 On the ties between national and constitutional identities under Art. 4§2 TEU see inter alia
D. Preshova, Battleground or Meeting point?: The Respect for National Identities in the European Union –
Article 4(2) The Treaty on European Union, Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 8 [2012]
267–298.
19 For a general analysis of the Treaty see P. Craig, The Stability and Governance Treaty: Principle, Politics and
Pragmatism, 37 European Law Review 2012. The conditionality principle is also expressed in the
preamble of the ESM Treaty: ‘financial assistance (…) will be conditional as of 1 March 2013, on the
ratification of the (StabilityTreaty) by the ESM member concerned and, upon expiration of the transposition period
referred to in Article 3(2) (of the Stability Treaty) on compliance with the requirements of that article’. See also
L.B., J.H.R., Editorial, The Fiscal Compact and European Constitutions: ‘Europe Speaking German’, in
European Constitutional Law Review, 8, 1, 2012, 1-7.
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assessment, the requirements are not that different from existing EU legislation.20
Article 3(2) FCT defines the rule of implementation of the Treaty. Member States
must enact rules on the balanced budget rule within national law within a year
from the entry into force of the Treaty. Article 3 FCT also specifies the nature of
the national provision through which the rule should be implemented: “provisions
of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise
guaranteed to be fully respected and adhered to throughout the national budget
process”. This part of the provision is complemented by the request of a
mechanism that should automatically correct “significant observed deviations”
from the goal of reaching a balanced budget in the medium-term21.This should
be done upon the proposal of the Commission.The provision of Article 3(2) FCT
it is further reinforced by Article 8(1), which “invites” the European Commission
to report on the measures enacted by the different States to comply with Article
3(2) FCT, and when it finds that a Member States failed to implement the
provision “the matter will be brought to the Court of Justice of the European
Union by one or more of the Contracting Parties”. The judgment of the Court
will oblige the infringing party to implement “the necessary measures to comply
with the judgment within a period to be decided by the Court”. Should the State
fail to implement the measures dictated by the judgment, another contracting
party can bring a new case to the Court of Justice in order to request the
imposition of financial sanctions. For some countries, among them Italy, Article 4
of the Treaty bears particular importance, because it mandates that if a Member
State has a debt of over 60% of its economy (defined according to EU Law) it
must reduce its debt by 1/20th per year.
These provisions mandated by the Fiscal Compact can raise important
theoretical and practical questions. From a theoretical point of view, it is worth
asking questions regarding the national measure needed to comply with the
request, and the role of the national legislature in the process of implementation of
the Treaty22.Will the Fiscal Compact respect all the expectations that have raised
so far? Technically the text of the international treaty does not fully guarantee
either the introduction of the debt brake into the various domestic legal orders or
20 According to Peers: ‘Article 3(1) is not as dramatic at it might first appear, as compared to existing EU legal
obligations’, See. S. Peers, The Stability Treaty: Permanent Austerity or Gesture Politics?, European
Constitutional Law Review, 8, 2012, 414.
21 As for Art. 3(1), Peers argues that this provision does not differ too much from EU law already in
force: ‘On an overall assessment, Article 3(2) does not differ much in principle from existing and proposed EU
legal obligations, but it is more precise and more binding (in terms of legal hierarchy) than those obligations’,
S. Peers, supra, 416.
22 See the questions raised by M. Maduro in A. Kocharov (ed.), Another Legal Monster? An EUI Debate on
the Fiscal Compact Treaty, EUI working paper 20112/09, available at: http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/
handle/1814/21496/LAW_2012_09_Kocharov_ed.pdf?sequence=1.
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its implementation in the correct legal form. To this extent, the implementation
into in Italian law offers a useful case study and an opportunity for reflection.
4 NEWARTICLE 81 IC: LIMITING PUBLIC BORROWINGWITHOUT
DOINGAWAYWITH LOOPHOLES
Before attempting to demonstrate that Constitutional Law n. 1/2012 and the
reinforced Law n. 243/201223 indeed limited public borrowing according to
Treaty’s provisions, but at the same time left open many loopholes for the purposes
of circumventing this limit, a brief analysis should be devoted to the original
version of Article 81 IC, the article which sets out the procedural rules on national
budgeting.24
According to some legal scholars,25 a “balanced budget rule” was already part
of the Italian Constitution prior to the reform, but, because of the recklessness of
the Italian political class, supported by the accommodating interpretation of the
Italian Constitutional Court, the rule’s rationale was distorted to the extent of
rendering it meaningless. According to another doctrinal position, and vice versa,
from the very beginning, former Article 81(4) IC did not incorporate any
reference to a “balanced budget”, but only to the necessity of a so called “financial
coverage” on the part of any law (other than the annual national or regional
budget law) implying new or additional expenditure.This coverage was thought of
merely as a tool to avoid single parliamentary initiatives that were not coordinated
with the framework of financial planning, a task which was expected to be carried
out by the government.26
23 The legal basis of which is Art. 81(6). On the very nature of this Law see R. Dickmann, Brevi
considerazioni sulla natura rinforzata della legge n. 243/2012 di attuazione del principio costituzionale del
pareggio di bilanci pubblici, Federalismi.it n. 6/2013.The full text of the reinforced Law is available at the
following address: http://www.pbo-dpb.gc.ca/files/files/Italy%20-%20Legge%20n%20243%202012_
eng.pdf.
24 Articles 97, 117 and 119 IC were also amended in order to explicitly bind all government entities as
well as regional and local authorities to the new rule. A. Gagliano, The Introduction of the ‘Balanced
Budget’ Principle into the Italian Constitution:What Perspectives for the Financial Autonomy of Regional and
Local Governments?, in Perspectives on Federalism, vol. 5, n. 1 (2013). G. Boggero, Gli obblighi di Regioni
ed enti locali dopo la legge n. 243/2012, in Amministrare n. 1/2014 - aprile, 93-148.
25 T. Groppi, supra, 7–8; G. Alfano, L’art. 81 della Costituzione e la “legge finanziaria”. Sistematica
disapplicazione della norma da parte dei suoi naturali destinatari, in www.forumcostituzionale.it, November
20, 2008; G. Bognetti, Il pareggio del bilancio nella Carta costituzionale, AIC n. 4/2011, 1 and 7; G. Di
Gaspare, Innescare un sistema in equilibrio della finanza pubblica ritornando all’art. 81 della Costituzione, in
www.amministrazioneincammino.luiss.it;A. Martino, Budget Deficits and Constitutional Constraints, Cato
Journal,Vol. 8, No. 3, 1989, 708.
26 A. Brancasi, Il principio del pareggio di bilancio in Costituzione, Osservatorio sulle Fonti, n. 1/2012;
G. Rivosecchi, Il cd. pareggio di bilancio tra Corte e legislatore, anche nei suoi riflessi sulle Regioni: Quando la
paura prevale sulla ragione, AIC n. 3/2012;V. Onida, Le leggi di spesa nella Costituzione, Giuffrè, Milano,
1964; G. Della Cananea, Indirizzo e controllo della finanza pubblica, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1996, 128.
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In the end, however, both interpretations, though diverging, came more or less
to the same conclusion, namely that Article 81(4) IC itself did not expressly forbid
financial coverage by means of public borrowing. The case-law of the Italian
Constitutional Court, which since 1966 has denied that old Article 81 (4) IC
represented the enshrinement by the Italian Constitution of a “balanced budget
rule” in an accounting sense, failed to consider that the recourse to medium and
long term public borrowing in effect bypassed the Constitutional norm.27 It might
in fact be true, as Bognetti recalls,28 that the former Article 81 was meant not to
constitute a formal deficit limit to what the budget law provided on an annual
basis, but rather a fiscal-discipline device; however, as a matter of fact, neither a
literal nor an original intent29 reading of this provision provided any guidance as
to how exactly new expenditures should be covered.30 According to the
Constitutional Court, the legislative power should merely have ensured a
long-term tendency towards a balance between revenues and expenditures (ex
multis, see Decision n. 1/1966).31
Moreover, it must be borne in mind that even if the wording “any other law”
(former Article 81(4) IC) was finally interpreted in a chronological way
comprehending not only the current financial year’s laws, but all subsequent laws
adopted after the annual budget law,32 there was still no clear constitutional limit
to public borrowing as a tool for financial coverage. Uncontrolled public
borrowing was indeed the main flaw of Italy’s fiscal Constitution. The 2012
Constitutional amendment was specifically aimed at limiting the recourse to
public borrowing, by fixing clearer constraints directly in a primary source of law.
Though the provisions of the Fiscal Compact Treaty (FCT), after the Law
authorizing the ratification n. 114/2012 had entered into force,33 were thus
susceptible to be applied, for example Article 117(1) IC, which asserts that
international obligations are to be interpreted as an interposed standard of review,
on the basis of which the constitutionality of domestic law is to be assessed, a mere
ratification would probably not have been evaluated as complying with Article 3(2)
FCT.While the FCT constitutes binding international law, its provisions as such
wouldn’t have
27 So stipulated Art. 7 of ordinary law n. 362/1988, whose limits were however constantly exceeded and
derogated. See G. Alfano, 2–3 e G. Bognetti, Costituzione e Bilancio dello Stato. Il problema delle spese in
deficit (Note ispirate dalla lettura di un libro di G. Rivosecchi),AIC, 2009, 27.
28 G. Bognetti, supra, 18–19.
29 A. Pirozzoli, Il vincolo costituzionale del pareggio di bilancio,AIC n. 4/2011, p. 5.
30 Cfr. A. Martino, supra, 709. Only a systematic approach as laid down by Della Cananea could have
stopped irresponsible public borrowing. See. G. Della Cananea, 99–106.
31 Recently, probably owing to the critical financial situation in Italy, the Constitutional Court has
seemed to acknowledge that Art. 81(4) IC enshrines the balanced budget rule in an accounting sense.
See. C. Buzzacchi,Copertura finanziaria e pareggio di bilancio: un binomio a rime obbligate?,AIC n. 4/2012.
32 See Constitutional Court, Judgement No. 384/1991.
33 Law No. 114/2012 23 Jul. 2012, G.U. n. 175 del 28 luglio 2012.
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been self-executing, considering that they would have lacked any procedural
character, in particular regarding the content of the budget law, the criteria for
ensuring the balance, those for allowing deviations, as well as the rules defining the
monitoring assessment.
From a formal point of view, the ultimate goal of the FCT seems to have
been achieved,34 since from 2014 onwards, «no recourse shall be made to borrowing
[…]» [Article 81 (2) IC]. Part of the legal doctrine is, however, uncertain
concerning the meaning of the first part of the phrase. Quite surprisingly, few legal
scholars argue that the recourse to public borrowing has now been de facto
prohibited.35 On the contrary, the present provision, like Article 81(1) IC, should
not be interpreted alone, but rather together with the exceptions to the general
rule laid down in the same Article 81(2) IC. Article 81(1) and (2) IC in fact
provide a «rule related to the primary balance» (Euro Plus Pact), i.e., a brake for public
borrowing, whereby the budget should be balanced without any new net
borrowing, while allowing for the renewal of maturing public debt by the State
and possibly even elusive financial investments such as securitization of debt or
direct capital intervention in public or private companies.36 “Net borrowing” is in
fact a common term used instead of “deficit”, enshrined in Article 2(b) of the
Protocol n. 12 on the Excessive Deficit Procedure and quoted from Article 3(3)(a)
FCT.This interpretation is confirmed in Article 2(1)(d) of the reinforced Law no.
243/2012.
In other words, Article 81(1) and (2) IC allow the automatic stabilizers to
work. Therefore, the new Article 81 IC does not really require Italy to commit
itself to a static numerical balance or a zero-deficit rule for every fiscal year, but
rather to achieve a cyclically-adjusted balance (net of one-off and temporary
measures), which allows for a higher deficit during a slowdown.37 As the 2005
Franco-German agreement showed, the use of a structurally balanced budget rule
will offer some political room for manoeuvre, in particular in determining the
cyclical components, i.e., the so called “output gap”, which is the difference
between nominal GDP and potential GDP.
The fact that, unlike Article 3(1)(b) of the Fiscal Compact Treaty, the Italian
Constitution simply places a stop upon net borrowing without indicating any
lower limit to it in terms of a percentage of GDP,38 does not make the Italian
provision any more rigid. On the contrary, Article 3(2) of the reinforced Law
34 So R. Miccù, Costituzionalizzare l’economia all’epoca della crisi in A.A., Il diritto costituzionale alla prova
della crisi economica,Atti del Convegno del 26-27 aprile 2012, 553–569.
35 F. Bilancia,Note critiche sul cd. pareggio di bilancio,AIC n. 4/2012, 2–3.
36 Dossier – Chamber of Deputies http://documenti.camera.it/leg16/dossier/Testi/ac0691.htm.
37 D.Morgante, La costituzionalizzazione del pareggio di bilancio, Federalismi.it, 11 luglio 2012, 6.
38 F. Bilancia, supra, 4.
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n. 243/2012 stipulates that «the balancing of budgets corresponds to the medium-term
objective». No explicit enshrinement of the stricter limit laid down in Article 3(1)(b)
FCT is in fact to be found in the Law. Article 3(5), in combination with Article
8(1) of the Reinforced Law, generically refers to EU Law and any international
agreements, without a specific commitment to a precise figure. This hints at the
fact that Italy may want to rely solely on its medium term objective, a benchmark
which is easily and frequently modified, rather than on the narrowest figure set by
the FCT,which may overly limit the government’s instinct for public spending.39
Additionally, an escape clause is defined in the second part of Article 81(2) IC.
‘In exceptional circumstances’ and upon authorization approved by the two Houses of
Parliament with an absolute majority vote, the Italian government may in fact
resort, though only temporarily, to public borrowing. Those circumstances
allowing for counter cyclical economic policies are listed in Article 5(d) of
Constitutional Law n. 1/2012, and include, as it is the case in Article (3)(1)(c) in
combination with Article (3)(3)(b) FCT, events outside the control of the State,
such as “severe economic recessions”, “financial crises” and “natural catastrophes”.
These expressions are reworded in Article 6 of the reinforced Law No. 243/2012,
which also sets forth the conditions under which deviating from the medium term
objective is considered not to be significant, that is, without triggering automatic
corrections.The boundaries between recourse to public borrowing for exceptional
circumstances and for reasons connected to automatic stabilizers are, however, not
clearly defined.
As for significant deviations,40 Article 8 of the reinforced Law does not
specify at what pace the deviation needs to be corrected. The original bill did,
however, define a precise reduction at a lowest rate of 0.5% per year.41 The
provision was repealed in the parliamentary commission reviewing the bill, based
on the assumption that it is more prudent to wait for the EU to decide, without
establishing too-rigid steps that may otherwise be softened after political
negotiation during the “European Semester”. Moreover, the correction
mechanism laid down in the reinforced Law does not provide for any explicit
obligation to run surpluses after deviating. More generally, no trace is to be found
of a constitutional obligation to run a surplus in times of economic upturns.The
aforementioned fears of Olli Rehn seemed thus to be justified, since Italy
eventually implemented an asymmetric balanced budget rule.42
39 Cfr. M. Nardini, La legge n. 243/2012 e l’adeguamento dell’ordinamento nazionale alle regole europee di
bilancio, Osservatorio sulle Fonti, n. 1/2013, 8. Contra G. Scaccia, La giustiziabilità della regola del pareggio
di bilancio,AIC n. 3/2012, 11.
40 Article 6(3) Reg. 1175/2011.
41 Dossier – Chamber of Deputies, 17 Jan. 2013 http://documenti.camera.it/leg16/dossier/Testi/BI05
99b.htm.
42 Contra D.Morgante, supra, 18.
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A final remark should be made regarding monitoring and enforcement of the
new rules.Also in this respect, the room for political discretion remains high.As for
the monitoring mechanism, Article 16 of the reinforced Law establishes the
Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO), the creation of which was provided for by
Article 5(f) of Constitutional Law No. 1/2012.43 Though formally autonomous
and independent, the Office is based at the Parliament, and its three members are
appointed for a six-year term by the Presidents of the two Houses of Parliament,
after being chosen from a list of ten names and being elected with a two-thirds
majority by the parliamentary commissions responsible for financial matters. No
incompatibility with a Member of Parliament’s mandate is foreseen. Moreover, the
PBO has no real power, besides its monitoring assessment duties - which are,
however, shared with the Government (Article 7) - and apart from a rather weak
“comply-or-explain” rule [Article 18 (3)], to bring a lawsuit before the
Constitutional Court. In the end, the monitoring is awkwardly split between the
PBO and the Court of Auditors.
Both bodies are not empowered with any new effective right to apply to the
Constitutional Court as part of the ex post budget auditing on whether the State
budget and assets have been properly managed (with reference to the Court of
Auditors see Judgment no. 335/1995). According to Article 27 of Law No.
340/2000, the latter may in fact bring a complaint before the Constitutional
Court only in two events: the first is when the Court of Auditors is about to
discharge its duties to preventively review the lawfulness of the executive’s acts. In
this case, the judges may discover the lack of financial coverage according to
Article 81(4), whereas it is indeed more difficult to ascertain whether the budget as
such is expected not to be balanced on the basis of a bare lacking of coverage.44
The second case is when the Court of Auditors is faced with the task of delivering
its Report on the State General Account (Rendiconto generale) at the end of every
fiscal year.The State General Account may be held not to be in conformity with
the Budget Law, and therefore an unbalanced budget eventually be ascertained.
Should this kind of lawsuit be successful, the violation will nonetheless be
acknowledged post factum, and the budget could have already produced many of
its effects.45 A last tool for maintaining the financial equilibrium might be to raise
a “conflict of powers allocation” to the Constitutional Court ex Article 134 IC.
However, the conflict may generally be raised solely within the ex-ante review (see
43 See Chamber of Deputies, The Establishment of the Parliamentary Budget Office in Italy, 20–22 Feb. 2013
and D. Cabras,Un Fiscal Council in Parlamento, in Federalismi.it n. 20/2012.
44 The right of the Court of Auditors to raise a plea of constitutional legitimacy while reviewing the
legality of State’s acts has been allowed since 1976 (Constitutional Court, Judgment No. 22/1976).
45 So G. Scaccia, La giustiziabilità della regola del pareggio di bilancio,AIC n. 3/2012, 8; M. Bergo, Pareggio di
bilancio “all’italiana”. Qualche riflessione a margine della legge n. 243/2012 attuativa della riforma
costituzionale più silenziosa degli ultimi tempi, Federalismi.it n. 6/2013, 28.
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ex multis Order No. 573/2000) and in any case not, for instance, with reference to
Legislative and law decrees issued by government ex Articles 76 and 77 IC (see
Judgment no. 406/1989).
5 CONCLUSIONS
In spite of the fact that an explicit limit upon the extent of public borrowing has
now been enshrined in the Italian Constitution, and is no longer a bare provision
of a single ordinary law, there are several reasons to doubt that this reform, both
formally and substantially, has brought about a fundamental breakthrough.This is
also due to the very same text of the Fiscal Compact Treaty (FCT) that can be
assumed to have mainly a political relevance. As far as the Italian legal order is
concerned,46 first of all, since the beginning of the 1990s, the rather sporadic case
law of the Italian Constitutional Court has already placed limits upon public
borrowing as a normal tool for covering public expenditures and has interpreted
the need for a coverage of expenditures so as to also be valid for subsequent
financial years and not only for the prevailing one (Judgment no. 384/1991).
However, nothing radical has changed since then. On the contrary, after a while,
public debt has begun to increase again.47 That is mainly because the rule has not
been interpreted strictly enough, i.e., as an obligation to be respected every year
and not in a vague long-term goal; but also because it was mainly regional
budgets, and not the national one, which were challenged before the
Constitutional Court. Now, as we have tried to point out, the new rule requiring a
“structurally balanced budget” in reality offers further room for many loopholes to
be put into place. In other words, the Fiscal Compact Treaty (FCT) does not
provide for stricter obligations.
Moreover, an audit that is weak, fractured and complicated will not ensure a
strict control upon the compliance with the rule. The reasoning underlying the
eventual choice of the constitutional legislator not to empower any organ with the
right to incidentally claim before the Constitutional Court, seems to match the
outdated political and philosophical thinking that the political class should be
collectively held responsible for the budget, rather than a bureaucratic or a
jurisdictional body. Only the Head of State can exert some influence here,
preventing a law from entering into force if deemed unconstitutional, for example
46 This is the opinion expressed by Peers, according to whom the Fiscal Compact’s relevance «is instead
political (and therefore economic) as a flamboyant gesture which signing and ratifying this treaty represents makes it
easier for states contributing to the ESM and EFSF to justify these actions to their parliaments and publics – and
possibly also their constitutional courts». See S. Peers, The Stability Treaty: Permanent Austerity or Gesture
Politics?, European Constitutional Law Review, supra, 441.
47 http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/quest_ecofin_2/qef_31;internal&action=_setlangua
ge.action?LANGUAGE=en.
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under Article 74(1) IC. However the Head of State’s power is not unlimited
according to Article 74(2) IC, pursuant to which ‘if such law is passed again, it shall
be promulgated’.
Those scholars who have favoured the solution adopted are in fact afraid of
“judicial activism” in fiscal matters, since, according to them, it would undermine
the autonomy of the Parliament and Government’s.48 However, in order to be
coherent with their opinion, they should also be very critical of two rather recent
judgments of the Italian Constitutional Court (see for example no. 223/2012 and
no. 116/2013) which basically misapplied the austerity measures pushed for by the
last Berlusconi government, thus causing a new budgetary hole, which now needs
to be filled.
We agree that, ultimately, Constitutions are about constraints, and that stricter
rules could have prevented, or could in the future still prevent, huge public debt
from being accrued. However, realism should teach us that as long as Constitutions
can be amended by the same politicians who decide to resort to public spending, a
single rule in a Constitution could not work in isolation.49 It is therefore better to
acknowledge, similarly to the Netherlands by simply referring in an ad-hoc Act of
Parliament to EU and international fiscal rules,50 that whether or not a EU
Member State will be sanctioned, is a blatant political matter, which will ultimately
be decided in Brussels as a result of harsh negotiations. If a Member State already
possesses a rather strong “stability culture” (Stabilitätskultur), as it is the case of the
Netherlands, there is no need to rack one’s brain in order to find out the best rule
to tighten up public finance management. If a Member State does not possess such
a culture, a structurally balanced budget rule will serve as a placebo for calming
down financial markets, but, because of the many loopholes with which the rule
will inevitably be filled, it won’t per se change or straighten out the attitude of a
political class, which will make every effort to procrastinate regarding budgetary
consolidation. Paradoxically, former Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, was
right in urging the new government to break EU budgetary rules, because they will
48 M. Luciani, Audizione alla Camera dei Deputati Commissioni Riunite (I e V), supra, p. 10; R. Perez, Il
bilancio dopo le riforme europee, in L. Cavallini Cadeddu (a cura di), Il coordinamento dinamico della finanza
pubblica, Napoli, Jovene, 2012, 18.
49 As libertarian philosopher De Jasay wittily pointed out ‘[…] With its key always within reach, a chastity
belt will at best occasion delay before nature takes its course […]’. A. De Jasay, The State, Indianapolis, Liberty
Fund, 1998 (ed. or 1985).
50 See M. Diamant – M.L. van Emmerik, Mandatory Balanced Budget Rule in Dutch legislation following
examples abroad?, (September 1, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2328757 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2328757.
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never kick us out of the single currency.51 Both ex Prime Minister Enrico Letta and
current Prime Minister Matteo Renzi seems to have taken into account this
suggestion, pushing hard for a relaxation of EU budget rules.The former, on July
3rd 2013, he hailed the decision of the European Commission to temporarily ease
deficit rules to help Member States boosting growth through investment
programs.52 The latter reinforced the same political objective to tilt the balance in
favor of more flexible fiscal rules, by declaring EU deficit limits for outdated and
officially putting off the target of balancing the State budget in structural terms
until 2016.
51 Silvio Berlusconi urges ItalianGovernment to BreakEUAusterityMeasures,International BusinessTimes,17 Jun.
2013.
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/479695/20130617/italy-silvio-berlusconi-fiscal-compact-eu.htm.
52 EU: Letta hails greater budget flexibility from executive, Adnkronos, 3 Jul. 2013 http://www.adnkronos.
com/IGN/Aki/English/business/EU-Letta-hails-greater-budget-flexibility-from-executive_3235891
3894.html.
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